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Betrayal and coincident definitions of the situation: Speaking about the role of context and environment, we have so far insisted on the influence of a certain type of situation (conflict) on betrayal. Therefore, it remains to think more clearly about the balance of power, imbalances and asymmetries that exist between the actors of betrayal. This point is far from insignificant: it not only determines in certain circumstances the qualification of breakups as betrayal, but, moreover, significantly influences how the “traitor” perceives himself and is perceived by other social actors. Moreover, this question takes us back to one of our original questions about betrayal: ultimately, is it simply a matter of perspective? Take the example of those who - within an administration, a company, a political organization, an institution - decide to publicly reveal a fault, a fraud , illegal activities or confidential information. can be translated as “informants”). This act will be well received by “We” as a betrayal. In most cases, those who "speak out" are immediately fired or suspended from work, unless they are harassed by those who employ them [4] This is the case of Tomaso Fronte, a former engineer working... However, the definition of the situation in this particular case is not shared by the Ego. With regard to this disclosure, there are two definitions of the situation in conflict. Knowing that the balance of power is unfavorable for the "Ego" (the situation often comes down - at least initially - to "one against all"), his eventual retraining will then depend on several elements. First of all, it is important to know whether such disclosure is authorized by law or not (detecting fraud when you have a right to do so is not the same as identifying a fault in a service when we have a duty to do so). reserve). Thus, the fact of being persecuted or judged by him can work to the benefit of “Us” and therefore the party that feels betrayed. However, an essential element is the ability of the “informant” to rely on a network of relationships, support and encouragement to counter this stigma and demonstrate the “validity” of their approach. And thereby impose its definition of the situation. If we return to our ternary configuration of We/Ego/Them, the Ego in a sense says: “This is not betrayal. Therefore, the support of “them” or the audience is necessary to legitimize this point of view. Therefore, this is a very important aspect of qualifying a breakup as cheating, and that is why it is systematically sought after. Here we can draw a parallel with the phenomenon of “institutional dissidence” that David-Junod talks about. The author uses this term to designate individuals whose professional practice conflicts with the standards of the institution in which they work. These people are usually gradually rejected and pushed into the background. At the end of the confrontation with their institution, they find themselves alone and “cannot count on any collective action to solve the problem they create” (David-Jougneau, 1989, p. 90). From this moment on, what the author calls an “appeal to the people” systematically occurs: the dissident - in order to continue his struggle - must bring it to a wider field. Using various means - articles, press conferences, petitions, happenings, books of testimonies... - the (former) dissident raises the issue on a public platform and attracts public opinion as a witness. When a statement finds a certain response, other social actors pick up the issue and “join the dance” (journalists, associations, political parties, other institutions or organizations, citizens, etc.). However, as a rule, there is an important element that determines this support . Indeed, when a person is accused of high treason, obtaining the support of a fairly wide publicto impose a different definition of the situation involves moving forward and acknowledging the “good reason” that led to the disruptive action. Thus, in his address to the people, a dissident may make a just cause, an informant may point out that he works for the state and therefore contributes in his own way to the public good, an unfaithful husband may claim that he was "love at first sight" and therefore bears no real responsibility for his actions, the spy can finally defend himself by insisting on the moral value of his cause or by claiming that he is acting for humanitarian purposes... Thus, the question of "good reasons" is crucial to qualify the breakup as cheating. The public's assessment of these reasons, often leading to support from third parties, can sometimes influence the blame and lead to a consensus on a different definition of the situation. Thus, a typology of "traitors" can be formally proposed, taking into account these two variables (blame or lack of good reason on the part of public, support or lack of support from third parties), as well as the points of view of the two groups present. (“We”/“They”). According to Åkerström (1991, p. 52), four ideal-typical figures can then be identified. In the first configuration, the "Ego" puts forward a compelling reason, which is recognized as such by the public and receives support from it: although for "We" he is defined as a traitor, for "Them" he will appear as a hero. . The two definitions of the situation are irreparably opposed. Here we can recall several famous traitors (the Rosenbergs), some whistleblowers (Tomaso Fronte) or dissidents from the Soviet era. In the second configuration, the "Ego" is not recognized as having good reasons to act, and yet it receives support from "Them." Thus, some dissidents, defectors or political groups considered traitors in their own countries receive support from third countries - not because of the reasons they put forward - but simply because they have a common enemy. From the point of view of “Them”, the traitor here is an “ally of circumstance”, and not a “hero” whose cause is publicly approved (and sometimes he turns out to be a very cumbersome ally). In the third configuration, the traitor moves forward and admits that he has a good reason for his actions, but fails to gain support for his cause. This usually happens to some whistleblowers who have failed to mobilize the general public in their fight. Here we can recall some of the “institutional dissidents” that David-Junod talks about, or the exemplary case of F. Serpico, an American policeman who exposed the corruption of his colleagues to no avail. Without tangible support, the traitor cannot impose a different definition of the situation here and effectively protect himself from stigmatization: his crusade will remain irrevocably alone. Finally, in the fourth configuration, the traitor fails to either convince the audience or gain any support. This category includes corrupt traitors, informants, “collaborators” and other “yellows”. This category is very often unanimously against this: there is a consensus between “us” and “them” on how to define the situation and how to apply the negative identity. There is no talk of mitigating circumstances. The traitor here is, in a sense, the ideal traitor. In this case, even those who benefit from this betrayal cannot boast about it or support it publicly. Then the principle of symmetry comes into full force. Therefore, with the same contempt they treat this act and those who became its victims: “How can we not despise our agent, a foreigner, who betrays his country, as our compatriots who betrayed in favor of the enemy? (Deverpe, 1994, p. 330). The question of the traitor's justification for his betrayal, the role of the public or external third party in ascribing and recognizing "good reasons" for this action shows us that